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The notion of knowledge-based program introduced by Halpern and Fagin provides a useful for-
malism for designing, analysing, and optimising distributed systems. This paper formulates the
two phase commit protocol as a knowledge-based program and then an iterative process of model
checking and counter-example guided refinement is followed to find concrete implementations of the
program for the case of perfect recall semantics in the Byzantine faults context with synchronous
reliable communication. We model several different kinds of Byzantine faults and verify different
strategies to detect them. We address a number of questions that have not been considered in the prior
literature, viz., under what circumstances a sender can know that its transmission has been successful,
and under what circumstances an agent can know that the coordinator is cheating, and find concrete
answers to these questions. The paper also describes a methodology based on temporal-epistemic
model checking technology that can be followed to verify the shortest and longest execution time of
a distributed protocol and the scenarios that lead to them.
1 Introduction
Distributed systems have proven to be hard to understand, design, and reason about due to their complex-
ity and non-deterministic nature. They usually involve subtle interactions of a number of components
in contexts of unpredictable environment. Reasoning about actions in distributed systems at the level of
knowledge allows us to abstract away many concrete details about the systems which helps to simplify
analysis of distributed systems. In particular, the notion of knowledge-based program introduced by
Halpern and Fagin [7] provides an abstract level of description of systems in which an agent’s actions
depend explicitly on the agent’s knowledge.
Knowledge-based programming has several advantages over classical programming (i.e. a style of
programming that does not explicitly use knowledge-based tests). First, knowledge-based programming
can be used to build an optimal solution for the given problem in the sense that agents do not overlook
opportunities to use relevant information that is available in their local states. Second, this style of
programming allows us to modify the developed program more easily when considering a context with
different properties such as different failure assumptions or different communication topology.
Unlike standard programs, knowledge-based programs cannot be directly executed, since the satis-
faction of the knowledge subformulas in the knowledge-based program depends on the set of all runs
of the program, which depends on the actions taken, which in turn depends on the satisfaction of these
knowledge subformulas. It has been proposed to address this apparent circularity by treating knowledge-
based programs as specifications, and defining when a concrete standard program satisfies this specifi-
cation [7]. However, due to the high complexity of information flows in distributed systems, finding a
concrete implementation for a given knowledge-based program can be a nontrivial task.
∗Thanks to Ron van der Meyden for some preliminary discussions on the topic of this paper.
2 The Two Phase Commit Protocol as Knowledge-based Programs
In this work we use the partially automated methodology proposed in [2, 1] to find a concrete im-
plementation for knowledge-based programs (KBPs) for the case of perfect recall semantics in which
agents make optimal use of their observations. The methodology is based on an iterative process of
model checking and counterexample guided refinement that helps the user to find predicates on the
agent’s observable variables that correspond precisely to the knowledge conditions given in the KBP. We
use the epistemic model checker MCK [8], to develop concrete implementations of knowledge-based
programs for extensions of the basic two phase commit protocol (2PC) [5].
Atomic commitment, of which the 2PC protocol is an example, is a problem of central importance to
distributed databases [9, 14] and the currently more popular atomic transactions tasks. The protocol can
be used in many interesting contexts and it has several applications in databases and computer network-
ing. As is often the case, in concurrency and distributed computing, even minor failures make a thorough
understanding and the development of correct solutions a very subtle issue. In this work, we extend the
known solutions by considering additional forms of faults, as well as by analysing questions that be-
come available within the epistemic framework, such as “when does a process know that the controller
is cheating?”, and “can all cases of cheating be detected?”
The objective of the new extension that we consider is to integrate a “cheating detection” mechanism
with the 2PC protocol while allowing the controller to behave maliciously. The goal is then to derive an
implementation of the protocol that is able to understand when the controller is cheating and to enable the
agents to respond appropriately when a cheating is detected. The perfect recall semantics of knowledge
is particularly relevant for the analysis of atomic commitment with Byzantine faults, where optimal use
of information is of concern. This issue is significant in the extension that we study in particular when
we allow the controller to cheat from one round to another. We also describe a methodology based on
temporal model checking that can be followed to find the lower and upper bound for termination in each
of the contexts that we study.
Related Work. The various failure modes in distributed systems have received great attention from the
researchers in the last two decades. The literature has concentrated mainly on three basic failure modes:
crash failures, omission failures, and Byzantine failures. However, robustness of distributed systems
against Byzantine attacks have been of prime importance and an active field of research for many years.
Byzantine behaviour also is subject to intensive research in computer security and cryptography. For
instance, there is a large body of work in the area of secure multi-party computation [17]. Byzantine
systems will be increasingly important in the future since malicious attacks are increasingly common
and can cause faulty nodes to act in any arbitrary manner.
Several researchers have used the theory of process knowledge in design and analysis of distributed
agreement protocols, of which atomic commit protocols are examples of these protocols. The works in
[9, 14] give a knowledge-theoretic treatment of atomic commitment. The authors show the minimum
knowledge levels that hold in two phase and three phase atomic commitment protocols. They determine
what knowledge processes need to commit or abort a transaction under the assumption that processes
can crash and recover. However, the approach described in their work is a manual approach and the
analysis is carried out by pencil and paper reasoning. The authors also have not studied the protocol in a
Byzantine faults context.
Knowledge-based programs have been used in papers such as [6, 10] in order to help in the design
of new protocols or to clarify the understanding of existing protocols. Examples of the development of
standard programs from knowledge-based programs can be found in [6, 13]. The approach described in
these papers is different from the one we discussed here in that it is done by pencil and paper analysis
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using the theory of knowledge. Examples of the use of epistemic model checkers to identify implemen-
tations of knowledge-based programs remain limited. One is the work of Baukus and van der Meyden
[4] who use MCK to analyse several protocols for the cache coherence problem using knowledge-based
framework. Another work is the work of Al-Bataineh and van der Meyden [2] who use MCK to analyse
the Herbivore protocol, an anonymous broadcast protocol, using knowledge-based programs.
Recently, Huang and van der Meyden [11] develop an approach that automates the construction of im-
plementations for knowledge-based programs for the case of the observational semantics for knowledge-
based programs. However, such semantics are not appropriate for the example we study in this paper
where we would like to derive implementations of knowledge-based programs of the 2PC protocol while
allowing agent to recall their past observations.
2 Epistemic Logic and MCK
Epistemic logics are a class of modal logics that include operators whose meaning concerns the infor-
mation available to agents in a distributed or multi-agent system. We describe here briefly a version of
such a logic combining operators for knowledge and linear time, and its semantics in a class of structures
known in the literature as interpreted systems [7]. We then discuss the model checker MCK [8], which
is based on this semantics.
Suppose that we are interested in systems comprised of n agents and a set Prop of atomic proposi-
tions. The syntax of the fragment of the logic of knowledge and time relevant for this paper is given by
the following grammar:
φ ::=⊤ | p | ¬φ | φ ∧φ | Kiφ | Xφ | Gφ | Fφ
where p ∈ Prop is an atomic proposition and i ∈ {1 . . .n} is an agent. (We freely use standard boolean
operators that can be defined using the two given.) Intuitively, the meaning of Kiφ is that agent i knows
that φ is true, Xφ means that φ will be true at the next moment of time, Gφ means that φ holds now and
all future time, and Fφ means in the future (or now) φ holds.
The semantics we use is the interpreted systems model for the logic of knowledge [7]. For each
i = 0 . . .n, let Si be a set of states. For i = 0, we interpret Si as the set of possible states of the environ-
ment within which the agents operate; for i = 1 . . .n we interpret Si as the set of local states of agent i.
Intuitively, a local state captures all the concrete pieces of information on the basis of which an agent
determines what it knows. We define the set of global states based on such a collection of environment
and local states, to be the set S = S0× S1× . . .× Sn. We write si for the i-th component (counting from
0) of a global state s. A run over S is a function r : N→ S. An interpreted system for n agents is a tuple
I = (R,pi), where R is a set of runs over S, and pi : S→P(Prop) is an interpretation function.
A point of I is a pair (r,m) where r ∈ R and m ∈ N. We say that two points (r,m),(r′,m′) are
indistinguishable to agent i, and write (r,m) ∼i (r
′,m′), if r(m)i = r
′(m′)i, i.e., if agent i has the same
local state at these two points. We define the semantics of the logic by means of a relation I ,(r,m) |= φ ,
where I is an intepreted system, (r,m) is a point of I and φ is a formula. This relation is defined
inductively as follows:
• I ,(r,m) |= p if p ∈ pi(r(m)),
• I ,(r,m) |= ¬φ if not I ,(r,m) |= φ ,
• I ,(r,m) |= φ1∨φ2 if I ,(r,m) |= φ1 or I ,(r,m) |= φ2 ,
• I ,(r,m) |= Xφ if I ,(r,m+1) |= φ ,
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• I ,(r,m) |= Gφ if for all m′ ≥ m we have I ,(r,m′) |= φ ,
• I ,(r,m) |= Fφ if there is m′ ≥ m such that I ,(r,m′) |= φ ,
• I ,(r,m) |= Kiφ if for all points (r
′,m′) of I such that ri(m) = r
′
i(m
′) we have I ,(r′,m′) |= φ .
MCK [8] is a model checker based on this semantics for the logic of knowledge. For a given in-
terpreted system I , and a specification φ in the logic of knowledge and time, MCK computes whether
I ,(r,0) |= φ holds for all runs r of I . Since interpreted systems are infinite structures, MCK allows an
interpreted system to be given a finite description in the form of a program from which the interpreted
system can be generated. It supports different semantics of knowledge, however, in this paper we will
work with respect to perfect recall semantics of knowledge in which agents make optimal use of their
observations, by taking all observations made in the past into account when computing what they know.
This issue is significant in the example that we study in this paper.
3 Knowlege-based Programs
Knowledge-based programs [7] are like standard programs, except that expressions may refer to an
agent’s knowledge. That is, in a knowledge-based program for agent i, we may find statements of the
form “v := φ”, where φ is a formula of the logic of knowledge. In general, knowledge-based programs
may have no implementations, a behaviourally unique implementation, or many implementations. Some
conditions are known under which a behaviourally unique implementation is guaranteed to exist. One
of these conditions is that agents have perfect recall and all knowledge formulas in the program refer to
the present time [16]. This case will apply to the knowledge-based programs we consider in this paper.
Suppose that we have a standard program P of the same syntactic structure as the knowledge-based
program P, in which each knowledge-based expression φ is replaced by a concrete predicate pφ of the
observable variables of the agent. In order to handle the perfect recall semantics, we also allow P to add
local history variables and code fragments of the form v := e, where e is an expression, that update these
history variables, so as to make information about past states available at the current time.
The concrete program P generates a set of runs that we can take to be the basis of an interpreted
system I (P). We now say that P is an implementation of the knowledge-based program P if for each
formula φ in a conditional, we have that in the interpreted system I (P). The formula pφ ⇔ φ is valid
(at times when the condition is used). That is, the concrete condition is equivalent to the knowledge
condition in the implementation. so we are guaranteed behaviourally unique implementations.
We now describe a partially automated process, using epistemic model checking, that can be followed
to find implementations of knowledge-based programs [2, 1]. The user begins by introducing a local
boolean variable vφ for each knowledge formula φ =Kiψ in the knowledge-based program, and replacing
φ by vφ . Treating vφ as a history variable, the user may also add to the program statements of the form
vφ := e, relying on their intuitions concerning situations under which the epistemic formula φ will be true.
This produces a standard program P that is a candidate to be an implementation of the knowledge-based
program P.
To verify the correctness of P as an implementation of P, the user must now check that the variables
vφ are being maintained so as to be equivalent to the knowledge formulas that they are intended to
express. This can be done using epistemic model checking, where we verify formulas of the form
Xn(pci = l⇒ (vφ ⇔ Kiψ))
where n is a time at which the test containing φ may be executed, pci is the program counter of agent i
and l is a label for the location of the expression containing φ . In general, the user’s guess concerning
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the concrete condition that is equivalent to the knowledge formula may be incorrect, and the model
checker will report the error. The next step of our process requires the user to analyse this error trace
(by inspection and human reasoning) in order to understand the source of the error in their guess for the
concrete condition representing the knowledge formula. As a result of this analysis, a correction of the
assignment(s) to the variable vφ is made by the user (this step may require some ingenuity on the part
of the user.) The model checker is then invoked again to check the new guess. This process is iterated
until a guess is produced for which all the formulas of interest are found to be true, at which point an
implementation of the knowledge-based program has been found.
4 Atomic Commitment Protocols
The atomic commitment protocols (ACPs) are a class of distributed protocols that aim to coordinate a
set of processes that participate in a distributed transaction on whether to commit or abort (roll back)
the transaction, while preserving the consistency of the distributed databases. An atomic commitment
protocol for distributed transactions is the one that satisfies the following requirements [5]:
• R1. (Atomicity): All-or-nothing, a transaction is committed if and only if all sub-transactions it
depends on also commit.
• R2. (Consistency): All non-faulty processes decide on the same value.
• R3. (Validity): The validity requirement can be classified into two requirements: the commit-
validity requirement which states that if all processes vote ‘yes’, then the decision will be commit,
and the abort-validity requirement which states if there is a vote saying ‘no’, then the decision will
be to abort.
We now give an informal description of the 2PC protocol that solves the problem of processing a
distributed transaction in a synchronous setting [5].
A set of processes {p1, .., pn} participate in a distributed transaction. Each process has been given its
own subtransaction. One of the processes will act as a coordinator and all other processes are participants.
The protocol proceeds into two phases. In the first phase (voting phase), the coordinator broadcasts a
start message to all the participants, and then waits to receive vote messages from the participants. The
participant will vote to commit the transaction if all its local computations regarding the transaction have
been completed successfully; otherwise, it will vote to abort. In the second phase (commit phase), if the
coordinator received the votes of all the participants, it decides and broadcasts the decision. If all the
votes are ‘yes’ then the coordinator will decide to commit the result of the transaction. However, if one
vote said ‘no’, then the coordinator will decide to abort the transaction. After sending the decision, the
coordinator waits to receive a COMPLETIONmessage from all the participants. The protocol terminates
whenever the coordinator receives all COMPLETIONmessages successfully.
To our knowledge, the protocol has not been verified using model checking in contexts where Byzan-
tine faults are possible. In the context of commit protocols, a Byzantine coordinator may process requests
incorrectly and/or produce incorrect or inconsistent outputs. A crash failure is normally detected by the
absence of an expected message within a specified time-out. A Byzantine fault is much harder than the
fail-stop model or the fail-recovery model. A number of interesting questions arise when considering
a distributed commit protocol in a Byzantine faults context. For example, what exact test needs to be
applied to determine whether the coordinator is cheating? Which participants are able to detect if the
coordinator is cheating? Are there situations where some participant is able to detect that the coordinator
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is cheating and decides to abort the transaction, while some other participant commits? Can the partici-
pants figure out whether the coordinator is cheating when increasing their observation capabilities using
the following means: (1) by allowing them to use traps (i.e. to open randomly some runs of the protocol,
and allowing the participants to observe each other’s vote and decision), or (2) by allowing the agent that
knows that the coordinator is cheating to publish its knowledge.
5 The Two Phase Commit Protocol As Knowledge-based Programs
In this section we give a formulation of the 2PC protocol (see Section 4) as a knowledge-based program.
In Figure 1 we give the knowledge-based program of the coordinator and in Figure 2 we give the
knowledge-based program of the participant. For the coordinator’s program, the variable vote[i] is
used to represent the vote that participant i sends to the coordinator which has three possible values
{undef ,no,yes}. Note that if by the end of the first phase vote[i]= undef it means that the coordinator
has not received the vote of participant i due to a communication failure. The boolean variable ack[i]
is used to record whether i has sent an acknowledgement message to c upon receiving an abort/commit
message from it. There are five environment variables byzantine, decision, RcvdStartMsg[i],
trap, and cheatingDetected. The boolean variable RcvdStartMsg[i] holds when the environment
delivers successfully the start message from the coordinator to the participant i. The variable decision
represents the decision that the coordinator makes during the execution of the protocol which has three
possible values {undecided,abort,commit}. Initially it has the value undecided. The boolean variable
trap is observable only by the participants and can be used by the environment to instruct the participants
to open the current run of the protocol. Similarly, the boolean variable cheatingDetected is observable
only by the participants and can be used by the participant that knows that the coordinator is cheating to
publish its knowledge. As in message passing systems, neither c nor i takes a receive action; we leave
message delivery to the environment’s protocol. The boolean variable byzantine is used to represent
whether the agent has a Byzantine behaviour. The double colon notation ‘::’ is used to model non-
determinism in the KB programs.
Agents have available the following actions. Each agent i can perform the action send(x, j, i) which
allows agent i to send some other agent j the message x. In addition to these actions, the coordinator can
perform the action sendall(x) which allows the coordinator to send the message x to all processes. We
chose message delivery to be completely under the control of the environment. This explains why there
are no receive actions in the programs. We assume also that communication is synchronous so that there
is an upper bound imposed on message delivery delay. The time delay parameters τs,τv,τk,τd , and τ f
used in the programs have been chosen in a way to guarantee proper synchronisation between processes.
Note that all synchronisation issues between the processes are handled in the environment’s protocol.
The boolean function AllVotesReceived() returns true if the coordinator received all participants
votes successfully.
The term cheatingc in the 2PCi program represents the condition that the coordinator c has a Byzan-
tine behaviour. We consider here two possible Byzantine behaviours of the coordinator. The first one
is to send an incorrect decision to the participants after receiving their votes: it may instruct them to
commit while the right decision is abort and vice versa. The second is to send contradictory messages to
the participants.
cheatingc = ((
∨
i=2..n(vote[i]= no)∨coord_vote= no)∧
∨
i=2..n(send(commit, i, c))) ∨
((
∧
i=2..n(vote[i]= yes)∧coord_vote= yes)∧
∨
i=2..n(send(abort, i, c))) ∨
(
∨
i, j=2..n,i6= j (send(commit, i, c)∧send(abort, j, c))))
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protocol 2pc-coordinator (byzantine, decision)
{
local variables: coord_vote, vote[2..n], ack[2..n];
sendall(start);
wait(τv); // wait τv time units to receive the participants votes.
if(¬byzantine) // if the coordinator is honest
{
if (coord_vote = no) then decision := abort;
if (coord_vote = yes)
{
for (i =2; i ≤ n; i++)
{
if (vote[i]= no∨ vote[i]= undef ) then { decision:= abort; break; }
if (i= n ∧ vote[i] = yes) then decision:= commit;
}
}
}
else if (byzantine)
{
if :: decision:= commit;
:: decision := abort;
fi;
}
// The announcement phase
if(¬byzantine) then sendall (decision);
// A faulty coordinator may behave maliciously in any arbitrary way.
else if(byzantine)
{
if :: sendall (decision);
:: {send (abort, 2, c) ; .... ; send (commit, n, c);}
:: {send (commit, 2, c) ; .... ; send (abort, n, c); }
....
fi;
}
// Retransmission and termination phase
while (true) do
{
for (i =2; i ≤ n; i++)
{
if (¬byzantine∧¬(Kc(Kˆi(decision)))) then send (decision, i, c);
else if (byzantine∧¬(Kc(Kˆi(decision))))
{
if :: send (decision, i, c);
:: send (abort , i, c) ;
:: send (commit, i, c) ;
fi;
}
}
wait(τk);
if (
∧n
i=2 (Kc (Kˆi(decision)))) then break;
}
}
Figure 1: The KBP of the coordinator (2PCc)
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protocol 2pc-part (RcvdStartMsg, decision[i], trap, cheatingDetected)
{
local variables: vote, ack, outcome;
if (RcvdStartMsg)
{
send(vote, c, i);
wait(τd); // wait τd time units to receive the decision of c.
// The decision phase augmented with some cheating detection strategies.
if (Ki(cheatingc)) then cheatingDetected := true; (1)
if (trap ∧ ¬cheatingDetected) then Open2PCRun(i);
if (Ki(cheatingc)∨vote= no) then outcome:= abort; (2)
if (¬Ki(cheatingc)) then outcome := decision[i]; (3)
// Transmission and termination phase
while (true) do
{
if (¬Ki(Kc(Kˆi(decision[i])))) then send(ack, c, i); wait(τ f );
if (Ki(Kc(Kˆi(decision[i])))) then break;
}
}
}
Figure 2: The KBP of the participants (2PCi)
The coordinator initially chooses its vote (coord_vote) non-deterministically and then it starts the
protocol by sending a start message to the participants. The coordinator starts the protocol by broadcast-
ing a start message to all the participants on the network. If by the end of the 1st phase, some partici-
pant’s vote was ‘no’, or there was a missing vote due to a communication failure (vote[i]= undef ), and
the coordinator is honest, then it decides to abort and broadcasts an abort message. On the other hand, if
all the participants’ votes were ‘yes’ and the coordinator is honest, it decides to commit and broadcasts
a commit message. Note also that the coordinator repeatedly sends the commit or abort command, until
it knows that all the participants have received the decision successfully. We use Kˆi(decision) in the
programs as an abbreviation for Ki(decision= commit ∨ decision= abort).
All the participants run the same knowledge-based protocol 2PCi, but with different environment
variables. Similar to the model of the coordinator, each participant initially chooses its vote non-
deterministically and then attempts to communicate the vote to the coordinator. In case the participants
detects that the coordinator is cheating then they decide to abort the transaction and terminate. Note
that it is necessary that the participants do not follow the decision of the coordinator immediately upon
receiving it since the coordinator might be faulty. The participants then need to adapt some strategies to
verify whether the coordinator is faulty. One possible strategy is to use traps. That is, to allow the partic-
ipants to open randomly some runs of the protocol and then to check whether the coordinator is cheating.
However, to achieve this more communication is required before making a decision. Moreover, some
collaboration among the participants is required: (1) the participant that does not know whether the re-
ceived decision is corrupted has then to wait for sometime before it makes a decision, (2) the participant
that knows that the coordinator is cheating has then to publish his knowledge immediately.
Omar Al-Bataineh 9
subprotocol Open2PCRun(agent i)
{
for ( j =2; j ≤ n ; j++ )
{
if ( j 6= i) { send(vote, j, i); send(decision, j, i); }
}
}
Figure 3: The Open2PCRun sub-protocol
5.1 Correctness Conditions
The first formula of interest is global consistency (i.e. all processes must abort or all must commit.)
Specification 1a: The global consistency is always guaranteed.
G (
∧
i6= j¬(i.outcome= abort∧ j.outcome= commit))
An important property of the protocol is that a decision made during its execution must be taken by all
processes.
Specification 1b: All processes will eventually decide.
F (
∧n
i=2 (i.outcome= commit∨ i.outcome= abort))
The first property states that no two processes decide on different values. On the other hand, the second
property states that it is impossible for a process to remain forever undecided.
Next, we want to verify whether the protocol guarantees the validity property in all the contexts that
we consider. We need to verify here two formulas.
Specification 2a: Commit-validity is always guaranteed.
G ((
∧
i=2..n(vote[i]= yes)∧coord_vote= yes)⇒ F (decision= commit))
Specification 2b: Abort-validity is always guaranteed.
G ((
∨
i=2..n(vote[i]= no)∨ (coord_vote= no))⇒ F (decision= abort))
For the Byzantine-faults context, we want to check whether the participants are able to detect if the
coordinator is cheating.
Specification 3: If coordinator c is cheating then everyone knows c is cheating.
X f ((cheatingc)⇒ Ki(cheatingc))
In general, Specification 3 needs to be verified at specific times f , straightforwardly determined from
the structure of the 2PCi program. We mark the places at which we need to verify Ki(cheatingc) by
asterisks so that it is easy for us to refer to them when discussing the implementations of the program.
Finally, we want to ensure that the protocol can always succeed to terminate. We say that the protocol
has successfully terminated if the coordinator and all the participants have terminated. Note that the
coordinator can only terminate if he knows that all the participants know the final decision. On the other
hand, the participant can terminate if he knows that the coordinator knows that he knows the decision.
Specification 4a: The coordinator c can always succeed to terminate.
F (Kc(Kˆi(decision)))
Specification 4b: The participants can always succeed to terminate.
F (Ki(Kc(Kˆi(decision))))
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6 The Protocol in The Byzantine-fault Context
In this context we allow the coordinator to cheat in a variety of ways as shown in the 2PCc program. We
assume that communication is synchronous and reliable.
First note that in order to implement the knowledge-based programs 2PCc and 2PCi we need to
replace the knowledge tests given in these programs by standard tests. Following the methodology de-
scribed at Section 3 we introduce some variables that we use to implement the knowledge tests in the pro-
grams. We introduce the variables retrans_cond[i] and stop_cond[i] to implement the knowledge-
based program of the coordinator. The variable retrans_cond[i] is used to capture the conditions
under which the coordinator needs to retransmit the decision to participant i, which we use to implement
the epistemic condition (¬Kc(Kˆi(decision))). The variable stop_cond[i] is used to represent the
conditions under which c has to stop sending the decision to i which we use to implement the epistemic
condition (Kc(Kˆi(decision))). Similarly, we introduce the variables retrans_cond, and stop_cond
to implement the knowledge-based program of the participants. The variable retrans_cond is used
to represent the condition concerning retransmission (¬Ki(Kc(Kˆi(decision)))). Finally, the variable
stop_cond is used to represent the epistemic condition concerning termination (Ki(Kc(Kˆi(decision)))).
implementations of the programs.
We first discuss the implementation of the knowledge-based program of the coordinator. Note that
there are two knowledge conditions that need to be implemented: termination condition (Kc(Kˆi(decision)))
and retransmission condition (¬Kc(Kˆi(decision))). From the analysis of the MCK counter-examples
that result from checking repeatedly the equivalence (Kc(Kˆi(decision)) ⇔ stop_cond[i]) until it
holds, we discover two situations under which the condition (Kc(Kˆi(decision))) holds. Note that we
initially assign the value false to the variable stop_cond[i] and then proceed monotonically until we
discover all situations under which the above equivalence holds. The first situation we discover is when
c receives an acknowledgement message from i after broadcasting an abort/commit message, which im-
plies that i has successfully received the decision of the coordinator. There is another, less obvious,
situation where the epistemic condition (Kc(Kˆi(decision))) may hold in this context, that happens
when i votes ‘no’. In this case i knows by the abort-validity requirement of the protocol that the only
possible decision is to abort. However, when c receives i’s vote it knows that i knows the decision, also
by the abort-validity requirement. On the other hand, when we seek an implementation for the epis-
temic condition concerning retransmission in the 2PCc program, MCK finds no condition under which
the coordinator has to retransmit the decision to the participants since the Byzantine behaviour of the
coordinator that we consider here does not aim to block or delay termination but aims to corrupt the final
outcome of the protocol. The following two predicates capture these situations.
c.retrans_cond[i] := false; c.stop_cond[i] := (vote[i]= no ∨ack[i])
We turn now to discuss the implementation of the knowledge-based program 2PCi. We need first
to find an appropriate implementation for termination and retransmission conditions. One situation in
which Ki(Kc(Kˆi(decision))) holds is when i sends a No-vote to the coordinator; again this is due to the
abort-validity requirement of the protocol. Another situation in which termination condition of i holds
in this context is when i receives a commit/abort message from the coordinator. Since we assume that
channels are reliable in this context, the coordinator knows once it sends the decision message that it
will be delivered successfully, and once i receives the message it knows that c knows that i knows the
decision. Similar to the implementation of retransmission condition at the coordinator side, MCK finds
no condition under which i needs to retransmit the acknowledgement message to the coordinator since
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in this context every sent message will be delivered successfully from the first transmission trail.
i.retrans_cond := false; i.stop_cond := (i.vote= no ∨ decision 6= undecided)
To complete the implementation of the knowledge-based program 2PCi in this context, we need to find
concrete implementations to the knowledge conditions Ki(cheatingc) and ¬Ki(cheatingc). We would
like to find the appropriate implementation to the test Ki(cheatingc) at two different places in the 2PCi
program marked with (1) and (2) and for the test ¬Ki(cheatingc) at the place marked with (3). The
implementations of these knowledge tests are given in Table 1. Note that the implementation of the epis-
temic condition Ki(cheatingc) at (1) can be different than its implementation at (2) since the knowledge
of the agents concerning cheating may evolve when the agents collaborate with each other and when they
use the traps. However, for a better understanding of the implementations we may note the following
situations in the (extended) protocol in which the conditions Ki(cheatingc) and ¬Ki(cheatingc) hold.
• The very obvious situation in which Ki(cheatingc) holds is when i sends a No-vote to c and
that the final decision sent by c is commit. In this case i knows that c is cheating since the final
decision contradicts with the abort-validity requirement of the protocol. Note that the agents that
vote ‘no’ are always able to decide correctly and the coordinator will not be able to cheat them
due to the abort-validity requirement. On the other hand, the agents that vote ‘yes’ will not be
able to determine whether the coordinator is cheating due to the commit-validity requirement of
the protocol. This explains why cheating detection is not always common knowledge and why it
is necessary for the agents to collaborate with each other to detect cheating.
• When we allow the agents to use the traps, we find that they are able to detect cases of cheating
that cannot be detected when they operate independently. The first situation is when they discover
some contradiction in the decisions sent by the coordinator since the coordinator is supposed to
send non-contradictory decisions to the participants. The second situation happens when the coor-
dinator sends consistent decisions but incorrect in the sense that they contradict with the validity
requirements of the protocol.
• The implementation of the test ¬Ki(cheatingc) is of interest here since we discover (assisted by
automation) several concrete conditions under which the agent cannot determine whether the coor-
dinator is cheating. The first case in which ¬Ki(cheatingc) holds is when i’s vote is yes and that
none of the agents announces for cheating (i.e. ¬cheatingDetected) and that the environment
does not choose to open the run. Since no one announced for cheating it implies that the coordina-
tor has not sent decisions that contradict with the abort-validity requirement. Also since the vote
of i is yes i cannot then determine by itself whether the coordinator is cheating whatever the value
of the received decision is. This is due to the commit-validity requirement of the protocol. The
second situation in which ¬Ki(cheatingc) holds is when the environment instructs the agents to
open the run (i.e. to use a trap) and that after opening the run the agents find that all the votes
are yes and all the decisions sent by the coordinator are consistent. In this case the agents will
not be able to determine whether the coordinator is cheating due to the fact that no one knows the
actual vote of the coordinator. Note that there is no need to use the trap and open the run if some
agent announces early that there is a cheating since in this case the agents will not gain any more
knowledge from using the trap.
Note that we consider in this paper a speculative version of the knowledge-based program, in which
an agent follows the decision of the coordinator if ¬Ki(cheatingc). One could also study a conservative
version of the protocol, where an agent only follows the coordinator’s decision if Ki(¬cheatingc) (i.e.
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The formula The equivalent predicates
Ki(cheatingc) (i.vote= no ∧ decision[i] = commit) (1)
((i.vote = no ∧decision[i] = commit)∨ cheatingDetected
Ki(cheatingc) ∨ (trap∧ (
∨
j,k=2..n(vote[ j] = no∧decision[k] = commit)
∨ (
∨
j 6=k, j,k=2..n(decision[ j] 6= decision[k])))) (2)
( (i.vote= yes ∧ ¬cheatingDetected ∧ ¬trap) ∨
¬Ki(cheatingc) (trap∧ (
∧
i6= j, j=2..n(vote[ j] = yes)∧ i.vote= yes) ∧
(
∧
j 6=k, j,k=2..n(decision[ j] = decision[k]))) (3)
Table 1: The implementations of the epistemic formulas concerning cheating
The 2PC protocol Specifications
The context 1a 1b 2a 2b 3 4a 4b
The Byzantine-fault fails holds fails fails fails holds holds
Table 2: The verification results of the protocol in the Byzantine context
if i knows that the coordinator is honest). The analysis above shows that in this case the agent would
commit only if it knows the actual vote of the coordinator which is not always possible in the Byzantine
fault context where the coordinator might be faulty. From this we note that if the agents use the test
Ki(¬cheatingc) in their program then they will never be able to commit any transaction!
The next question of interest is then whether all cases of cheating can be detected when adapting the
above mentioned strategies. The answer obtained by model checking is that it does not, where MCK
discovers a counter-example when verifying Specification 3. The counter-example happens when all
participants votes are ‘yes’ and the coordinator sends consistent but incorrect decisions. In this case,
since no one knows the actual vote of the coordinator, he can easily cheat the participants without being
detected and the participants will not benefit from using the traps. Note that the proposed cheating
detection strategies help to mitigate the impact of cheating but do not fully eliminate the possibility of
cheating as some kinds of cheating remain undetected (see Table 2). We leave to future work the problem
of verifying other effective strategies for detecting Byzantine faults.
7 Finding The Shortest/Longest Run of The Protocol
Efficiency and performance are necessary issues in the design and development process for distributed
protocols. We describe an approach, using temporal-epistemic model checking that can be followed
to find the longest and shortest runs in which processes can reach their goal state, and demonstrate its
application using our case study. To verify the optimal run of the protocol, we use the model checker to
verify formulas of the following form
φ = Xn (¬(Kc(Kˆi(decision)))). (1)
Note that the negation of formula (1) represents the epistemic condition concerning termination for the
controller (see Specification 4a at Section 5.1). So the goal for process c is to reach a state at which the
epistemic formula (Kc(Kˆi(decision))) holds. Recall that the coordinator can terminate only when he
knows that all the participants know the final decision. To discover the optimum run of the protocol, we
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The 2PC protocol The Shortest run The Longest run
The context #of rounds #of messages #of rounds #of messages
The Byzantine-fault context 1 (d−1) 3 3(d−1)
Table 3: The best and worst case scenarios of the protocol in the Byzantine context
start with the above negative temporal-epistemic formula φ that says that there is no run where c can
terminate at time n. The user needs to repeatedly verify φ while doubling the value of n until the formula
fails, and then use binary search to find the first time the formula fails. Let us say that the first time φ fails
is when n= k, we then say that the optimum run of the protocol takes k-rounds. However, to discover the
details of the optimum run, the user needs to model check φ at n = k, the model checker then generates
a counterexample that leads him to discover the optimum run. A counter-example to the specification
that the MCK returns when the above formula fails is a sequence of states r(0), ...,r(k) from run r where
(I,r(m)) |= ¬(Kc(Kˆi(decision))) for all m< k, and (I,r(k)) 6|= ¬(Kc(Kˆi(decision))).
On the other hand, to discover the least upper bound for termination of the protocol, we use the model
checker to verify formulas of the following form
¬φ = (Xn (Kc(Kˆi(decision)))). (2)
Formula (2) states that at time n in every run of the protocol the controller can terminate. Again, the
user needs to repeatedly verify ¬φ while increasing the value of n until he finds the first time where the
formula holds (if any). We remark here that we model agents using perfect recall semantics so that agents
do not lose their knowledge over the time. Let us say the first time ¬φ holds is when n= w, we then say
that the least upper bound for termination is w. Now to discover the run with the least upper bound, the
user needs to model check ¬φ at n= (w−1), where (w−1) represents the last round at which ¬φ fails.
The counter-example generated by model checking ¬φ at n = (w−1) will lead the user to discover the
run at which c cannot terminate at round (w− 1) and needs one more round, which represents the least
upper bound for termination.
In Table 3 we summarise the lower bound and the least upper bound for termination in each context
in terms of the number of communication rounds and message traffic, where d denotes the number of
agents in the environment. It is interesting to mention that the derived implementations for the two
contexts have been verified for d = 2,3,4 and 5. We conjecture that our present implementation can be
shown to work for all number of agents and it would be interesting to have a proof of this claim: this
would have to be done manually unless an induction can be found for the model checking approach.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have used the knowledge-based approach and a methodology based on model checking
to derive a family of protocols for the distributed transaction commit problem in a Byzantine faults
context. The problem of analysing the correctness of distributed algorithms specifically in the presence
of (Byzantine) faults in an automated fashion is very important and has been largely ignored by both
the formal methods and distributed algorithms communities. In future, we aim to verify some other
mechanisms for detecting Byzantine faults in particular when replicating the transaction coordinator
and employing some cryptographic techniques. There are some protocols such as various distributed
consensus protocols under Byzantine faults that are extremely tricky to reason about, and thus model
checking tools for knowledge-based programs could potentially be used to optimize their behaviour.
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